Summary
CVE-2026-53611 is a critical OS command injection vulnerability in Looking Glass, a network diagnostic platform (developed by AS203038) that exposes ping, traceroute, and BGP lookup functionality via a gRPC API and web UI. The flaw resides in the BGP AS-path input validation logic and allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the underlying host. The vulnerability carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (Critical).
Technical details
- Root cause: The
SanitizeASPathRegexinput validation function uses an unanchored regular expression to validate BGP AS-path input. Because the regex only checks for a matching substring rather than validating the entire input string, it can be satisfied by a payload that contains a valid numeric AS-path sequence followed by additional, unsanitized shell metacharacters (e.g.,65001';id;). - Trigger conditions: An attacker submits a crafted BGP AS-path value (via the gRPC/HTTP2 API or the web UI’s BGP lookup feature) containing a valid AS number followed by shell command syntax that breaks out of a single-quoted string context used in an underlying SSH/shell execution template.
- Attack vector: Network-based (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), no privileges required (PR:N), no user interaction required (UI:N) — the endpoint is reachable without authentication.
- Impact: Successful exploitation results in arbitrary OS command execution in the context of the Looking Glass service/container, enabling full compromise of the container, disclosure of sensitive environment variables, and theft of infrastructure credentials such as SSH private keys.
Affected software
- Looking Glass (AS203038), package
github.com/AS203038/looking-glass/pkg/utils— all versions prior to 1.3.5
Severity
- CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)
- Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Mitigation and recommended actions
- Immediate: Upgrade Looking Glass to version 1.3.5 or later, which anchors the AS-path validation regex to enforce strict whole-string matching and closes the injection path.
- If immediate patching is not possible:
- Restrict network access to the Looking Glass gRPC/HTTP2 API and web UI to trusted networks only (e.g., via firewall rules or VPN), removing direct internet exposure.
- Disable or block the BGP AS-path lookup feature at the application or reverse-proxy layer until the upgrade can be applied.
- Monitor logs for anomalous shell metacharacters (e.g., quotes, semicolons) submitted in AS-path lookup requests as an indicator of exploitation attempts.
- Rotate any credentials (SSH keys, environment secrets) accessible to the Looking Glass service host, given the risk of prior undetected exploitation.

