Summary
CVE-2026-55393 is a critical path traversal (Local File Inclusion) vulnerability in the Aware2 software running on Teledyne FLIR PackBot and FirstLook robots. A web service on the device fails to validate user-supplied pathnames, allowing a remote, unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary configuration and security-sensitive files from the robot’s filesystem. The flaw carries a maximum CVSS v4.0 base score of 10.0 (Critical) and was publicly disclosed by Mandiant on October 1, 2026.
Technical details
- Root cause: A web interface endpoint on the robot’s Aware2 software accepts user-supplied input (a pathname/filename parameter) and uses it to construct a filesystem path without adequate sanitization, enabling directory traversal (CWE-22).
- Trigger conditions: An attacker with network access to the robot’s web service can send a crafted HTTP request containing path traversal sequences; no authentication or user interaction is required.
- Attack vector: Network-based (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), no privileges required (PR:N), no user interaction (UI:N) — fully remote and unauthenticated.
- Impact: Successful exploitation allows disclosure of configuration files, credentials, and other security-relevant OS files stored on the robot. Mandiant notes that the exposed data could be leveraged for further compromise, including privilege escalation and potential remote code execution against the robot platform.
Affected software
- Teledyne FLIR Aware2 (PackBot): versions through 6.9.0.2
- Teledyne FLIR Aware2 (FirstLook): versions through 1.7.9
Severity
- CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 10.0 (Critical)
- Vector:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Mitigation and recommended actions
- Immediate: Teledyne FLIR released patched Aware2 software on September 30, 2026. Organizations operating affected PackBot or FirstLook robots should contact Teledyne ([email protected]) to obtain the updated, patched software and apply it as soon as possible.
- If immediate patching is not feasible: Restrict network access to the robot’s web management interface to trusted, segmented networks only (e.g., isolated operational technology/robotics VLANs), disable remote exposure of the web service to untrusted networks, and monitor for anomalous HTTP requests containing path traversal sequences (e.g.,
../) targeting the device’s web interface.

