Summary
CVE-2026-80349 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability (CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing) affecting TarsCloud TarsWeb, the web-based management dashboard for the TARS microservices platform. The flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to spoof a trusted-proxy header and impersonate any existing account — including administrators — granting full control over the management console. The issue carries a Critical severity rating (CVSS 9.3) and affects all versions of TarsWeb up to and including 3.0.14.
Technical details
- Root cause 1 – unrestricted proxy trust: TarsWeb’s
app.jssets Koa’sapp.proxy = truewithout restricting which upstream proxies are trusted, so the application derives the client’s source IP directly from the client-suppliedX-Forwarded-Forheader. - Root cause 2 – conflated allowlist and identity logic: The SSO middleware (
midware/ssoMidware.js) uses a single code branch to both skip authentication for IP-allowlisted callers (config/loginConf.jslists127.0.0.1/localhostas trusted) and to assign the effective account identity from the caller-supplieduidquery parameter, without validating any ticket, cookie, or password. - Trigger conditions: An attacker sends a request with the header
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1and appends auidquery parameter naming an existing account (e.g.,?uid=admin) to any endpoint under/api,/pages/server/api,/k8s/api, or/pages/k8s/api. - Attack vector: Network-based, no authentication or user interaction required, low attack complexity.
- Impact: Full unauthenticated impersonation of any account, including administrators — enabling user/role management, service configuration changes, and package/binary deployment across the managed TARS platform.
Affected software
- TarsCloud TarsWeb versions 0 through 3.0.14 (inclusive)
Severity
- CVSS Score: 9.3 (Critical)
- Vector:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Mitigation and recommended actions
- Immediate: Upgrade to TarsWeb 3.0.16 or later, which separates the IP-allowlist handling from identity assignment so that allowlisted callers receive only a configured default account rather than an attacker-controlled
uid. - If immediate patching is not possible:
- Disable or remove
app.proxy = true(or restrict trusted proxies explicitly) soX-Forwarded-Forcannot be spoofed by external clients. - Remove or tighten the
ignoreIpsallowlist inconfig/loginConf.js, and ensure any network path reaching TarsWeb passes through a proxy layer that strips/overwrites client-suppliedX-Forwarded-Forheaders before they reach the application. - Restrict network access to the TarsWeb management interface to trusted internal networks/VPN only, and place it behind an authenticating reverse proxy until patched.
- Disable or remove

