Summary
CVE-2026-85180 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Ollama, an API server used to run large language models. It affects versions 0.30.0 through 0.33.2 and stems from insufficient validation of redirect destinations when the server pulls tensor-layer model blobs. The flaw is rated High severity (CVSS 8.7) and requires no authentication or user interaction to exploit.
Technical details
- Root cause: The
resolve()function in Ollama’s tensor-layer blob transfer code path does not validate that HTTP redirects stay on the original registry host, unlike the equivalent non-tensor download path. - Trigger conditions: An attacker who controls (or spoofs) a model registry can serve a manifest referencing a tensor-layer blob, then respond to the download request with an HTTP redirect (e.g., 301/302/307) pointing to an internal or attacker-chosen host.
- Attack vector: Network — exploitation occurs via an unauthenticated request to the Ollama server’s model pull functionality (
/api/pull), which then follows the malicious redirect. - Impact: The Ollama server can be coerced into issuing outbound GET requests to internal network hosts or cloud metadata services (e.g., instance metadata endpoints), potentially exposing sensitive internal data or credentials. Impact is limited to confidentiality; integrity and availability are not affected per the CVSS vector.
Affected software
- Ollama (ollama/ollama), versions 0.30.0 through 0.33.2 (inclusive)
Severity
- CVSS v4.0: 8.7 (High) —
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - CVSS v3.1: 7.5 (High) —
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Mitigation and recommended actions
- Immediate: No officially confirmed patched release has been identified at the time of writing; monitor the Ollama project for a fix that adds host-allowlist validation to the tensor-layer blob redirect handling (mirroring the fix pattern used for a prior SSRF issue in the non-tensor download path).
- Workarounds/network mitigations:
- Restrict outbound network access from hosts running Ollama so they cannot reach internal-only services or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., block egress to 169.254.169.254 and internal RFC1918 ranges from the Ollama process).
- Only pull models from trusted, vetted registries; avoid configuring Ollama to pull from untrusted or attacker-controllable registry URLs.
- Deploy Ollama behind network segmentation so that even if SSRF is triggered, reachable internal targets are minimized.

