Summary
CVE-2026-85684 is a path traversal vulnerability (CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path) in the marker document-processing package by datalab-to (PyPI package marker-pdf), versions through 2.0.0. The flaw resides in the FastAPI /marker/upload handler, which fails to sanitize the file.filename parameter, allowing an unauthenticated network attacker to write arbitrary files to, or delete existing files from, the host filesystem. The vulnerability carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (Critical).
Technical details
- Root cause: the upload handler builds the destination path with
os.path.join(UPLOAD_DIRECTORY, file.filename), using the client-supplied filename directly with no validation, normalization, or use ofos.path.basename(). - Trigger condition: an attacker submits a file to the
/marker/uploadendpoint with a filename containing directory traversal sequences (e.g.../) instead of a plain filename. - Attack vector: network, no authentication and no user interaction required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N).
- Impact: the crafted filename can cause the server to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem paths, or overwrite/delete existing files outside the intended upload directory — impacting integrity and availability of the host.
Affected software
marker(PyPI packagemarker-pdf), all versions from 0 through 2.0.0 inclusive.
Severity
- CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 9.1 (Critical) —
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 8.8 (High) —
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Mitigation and recommended actions
- Immediate: Upgrade to a
markerrelease that sanitizes uploaded filenames (verify with the vendor/project which released version resolves this issue, as no fixed version is stated in the CVE record at the time of publication). - If no patch is available: Restrict network access to the
/marker/uploadendpoint (e.g., place it behind authentication, a reverse proxy, or firewall rules limiting exposure to trusted hosts); do not expose the marker server directly to the internet; monitor/alert on file writes outside the configured upload directory; consider deploying the service with a filesystem sandbox or read-only root filesystem to limit write impact.
How IONIX identifies potentially affected assets
IONIX matches the following signal against data already collected when it crawled the asset; identifying the technology sends no request beyond that crawl.
- Raw response body:
<h1>Marker API</h1>

