Summary
CVE-2026-92717 is a missing-authentication vulnerability (CWE-306) in Covenant, an open-source .NET command-and-control (C2) framework, affecting all versions through 0.6. The CovenantHub SignalR hub is registered without an [Authorize] attribute, allowing unauthenticated attackers to invoke a method that returns a valid, long-lived JWT token. That token grants full access to the operator REST API, exposing active implant sessions, harvested credentials, exfiltrated files, and operator account details. The flaw carries a CVSS score of 9.3 (Critical).
Technical details
- Root cause: The
CovenantHubSignalR hub (Covenant/Hubs/CovenantHub.cs) is missing the[Authorize]attribute that is present on Covenant’s other SignalR hubs, leaving it reachable without authentication. - Trigger conditions: An unauthenticated client connects to the
/covenanthubSignalR endpoint and invokes theCreateHttpListenermethod. - Attack vector: Network — no credentials, prior access, or user interaction required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N).
- Impact: The invoked method returns a signed JWT (carrying a "Listener" role) with an approximately 2000-day expiration. Because Covenant’s REST API controllers only enforce a generic JWT-bearer policy without role checks, this token authorizes full access to the operator API — including grunt (implant) sessions, stored credentials, generated binaries/launchers, event logs, tasking data, and the operator account roster.
Affected software
- Covenant (cobbr/Covenant) — all versions through 0.6, inclusive
Severity
- CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 9.1 (Critical) —
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - CVSS v4.0 Score: 9.3 (Critical) —
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Mitigation and recommended actions
- Immediate: No patched release has been published at the time of this advisory. Monitor the upstream Covenant repository and Issue #406 for a fix and upgrade as soon as one is released.
- If no patch is available: Restrict network access to the Covenant server (management interfaces, including the
/covenanthubSignalR endpoint and REST API) to trusted operator networks only, e.g., via VPN, firewall allow-listing, or placing the deployment behind an authenticating reverse proxy. Do not expose Covenant C2 infrastructure directly to the internet. Rotate any credentials, session tokens, and grunt/implant secrets if exposure is suspected, and review access logs for unauthenticated SignalR connections or unexpectedCreateHttpListenerinvocations.

