Summary
CVE-2026-97055 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in SigNoz, an open-source observability platform, caused by the JWT tokenizer defaulting to an empty signing secret that is never validated at startup. Any deployment that does not explicitly configure a JWT secret signs and verifies session tokens with an empty HMAC key, letting an attacker forge valid session tokens for any existing user — including administrators — without credentials. The issue carries a CVSS v4.0 score of 9.2 (Critical), reflecting full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability over the network.
Technical details
- Root cause: the tokenizer configuration parameters
SIGNOZ_TOKENIZER_JWT_SECRET(and the deprecatedSIGNOZ_JWT_SECRET) default to an empty string (""), and SigNoz’s validation logic fails to reject this insecure default before signing/verifying tokens. - Trigger condition: the flaw is present on any SigNoz instance running the default (opaque-less) JWT tokenizer without an explicitly configured, non-empty signing secret.
- Attack chain: an attacker obtains a target user ID (from logs, URLs, or token payloads) and the organization ID via the unauthenticated
/api/v2/sessions/contextendpoint, then crafts a JWT signed with the known-empty HMAC key to impersonate that user. - Attack vector: fully remote and unauthenticated over the network (AV:N); exploitation requires no user interaction.
- Impact: forged access and refresh tokens grant full account takeover, including admin impersonation and complete control over the SigNoz instance. Forged refresh tokens cannot be revoked and remain valid for their default 30-day lifetime, enabling persistent, long-lived unauthorized access to all stored telemetry (traces, logs, metrics) and configuration data.
Affected software
- SigNoz versions v0.8.0 through v0.142.1 (inclusive) using the default JWT tokenizer without a manually configured, non-empty signing secret.
- Fixed in v0.143.0, which defaults to an opaque tokenizer with proper validation.
Severity
- CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.1 (High) —
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - CVSS v4.0 Score: 9.2 (Critical) —
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Mitigation and recommended actions
- Immediate: Upgrade SigNoz to v0.143.0 or later, which replaces the vulnerable default tokenizer with an opaque tokenizer that enforces validation of the signing secret.
- If immediate patching is not possible: explicitly set
SIGNOZ_TOKENIZER_JWT_SECRETto a strong, randomly generated value (do not leave it unset or empty) and restart the service so all previously issued tokens are invalidated. - Additionally, restrict network exposure of the SigNoz management interface and API endpoints (including
/api/v2/sessions/context) to trusted networks where possible, and rotate any credentials/tokens issued prior to remediation.

